Pay for performance (P4P) has become a popular approach to performance improvement in health care. Most of the P4P literature has focused on the United States and there is limited insight in the characteristics of major programs initiated in other countries. This article systematically describes and reviews P4P programs outside the United States. Our literature search identified 13 programs initiated in 9 countries. Although the programs share many similarities, they differ in several important respects, also when compared with the typical P4P program in the United States. In addition, there are clearly possibilities to increase incentive strength and minimize incentives for undesired behavior. In part, observed heterogeneity will be a consequence of contextual differences, but design choices often also seem to be made arbitrarily. In designing their programs, purchasers are hampered by limited knowledge of the influence of specific design choices and effective strategies to mitigate undesired behavior.
Introduction
Rising health care expenditures and deficiencies in the quality of care emphasize the need to increase efficiency in health care. Pay for performance (P4P), in which Review health care providers receive explicit financial incentives for reaching targets on predefined performance measures, is considered a promising strategy to spur necessary improvements. The premise of P4P is that providers are responsive to financial incentives and that each of the commonest payment methods (i.e., fee-for-service, capitation, and salary) separately creates incentives for undesired behavior while none of them are designed to stimulate good performance. Given that performance measurements have become more accurate over the past two decades, it seems appropriate to use financial incentives explicitly to stimulate improvement. In recent years, interest in applying P4P in health care has greatly increased. In the United States, P4P is widely applied by public and private purchasers. In addition, P4P is being increasingly applied elsewhere, including in Canada, Australia, and several European countries.
To date, most of the P4P literature has focused on the United States. There is now insight in how U.S. programs are typically designed and how they have developed. In contrast, there is limited insight in the features of major P4P programs initiated in other countries. In this article, we aim to describe P4P programs that have been initiated outside the United States in terms of key design elements. Careful consideration of the design of P4P is important because inadequately designed programs may result in undesired provider behavior. Several authors have argued that the limited effectiveness of P4P (Christianson, Leatherman, & Sutherland, 2008; has partly been a result of flaws in design (Christianson et al., 2008; Institute of Medicine, 2007; McDonald, White, & Marmor, 2009; Petersen, Woodward, Urech, Daw, & Sookanan, 2006; Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007; . A second objective of this article is therefore to assess the extent to which programs are designed appropriately.
New Contribution
If P4P is to achieve desired results, careful consideration of program design is vital. The inconclusive evidence on the effectiveness of P4P suggests that design has not been optimal. In this respect, insight into the design of current P4P programs would be useful in improving P4P performance. With the exception of the United States, there has been no comparative investigation of the characteristics of major programs initiated across the world. In this article, we aim to fill this gap by systematically describing and critically reviewing non-U.S. P4P programs using a theory-based organizing framework. For purchasers and policy makers this information will be of interest as it provides lessons from experiences with P4P in practice and enables comparison of typical design in different settings. The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of key elements of appropriate P4P program design. Subsequently, after explaining the methods and search strategy, identified programs are described and assessed on the appropriateness of their design. The final section discusses the results. inclusion should be facilitated (Landon & Normand, 2008) . Finally, participation is ideally voluntary. Imposed participation may impair providers' intrinsic motivation and may lead to negative provider reactions. However, efforts may be needed to yield high participation rates and to prevent creating or enlarging disparities.
How to Incentivize: Structure of the Incentive Scheme
Individuals tend to respond more strongly to negative incentives than to positive incentives of equivalent size (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . However, negative incentives are likely to be perceived as unfair and may result in negative reactions (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Town et al., 2004) . Conversely, programs using rewards may not be sustainable. If rewards are not possible, the extent to which P4P will be successful depends on whether providers can be convinced to participate and whether undesired behavior can be prevented.
All else equal, the larger the potential revenue for providers, the larger their response (e.g., Mullen, Frank, & Rosenthal, 2010) . Payments must be large enough to offset the cost of improving performance (Conrad & Perry, 2009; Young & Conrad, 2007 ). Yet large payments are not necessarily more effective than smaller payments because physicians often have a target income (Rizzo & Blumenthal, 1996; Rizzo & Zeckhauser, 2003) and because of diminishing marginal utility of income. In addition, large payments are likely to impair providers' intrinsic motivation more than smaller payments (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Frey, 1997) , which may lead to undesired effects (McDonald & Roland, 2009 ). In addition to size, frequency may also be important. Individuals tend to value immediate outcomes more than future outcomes of equivalent size (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002) . Thus, paying $100 each month may be more effective than paying $1,200 each year, also because it enhances incentive salience (Damberg et al., 2007) . Finally, absolute targets are likely more effective than relative targets because they are transparent and create less uncertainty regarding the efforts required to become eligible for payment (Conrad & Perry, 2009 ). In addition, relative targets encourage competition, which may reduce collaboration and dissemination of best practices (Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007) . However, when a program is applied uniformly to a large number of providers, absolute targets may not be efficient because payments are made for performance already being delivered. Also, the goal-gradient hypothesis predicts that little response can be expected if the target is perceived unattainable or if the target is already attained (Heath, Larrick, & Wu, 1999) . Adopting a tiered series of targets or differentiating targets based on baseline performance (with payment size conditional on level of attainment) can resolve this issue. Alternatively, purchasers may opt for paying providers a "piece-rate" for each appropriately managed patient or each recommended service (Chien, Li, & Rosenthal, 2010; Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007) .
Method

Search Strategy and Selection Procedure
To ensure a comprehensive inclusion of available literature on existing P4P programs, we consulted several sources, including Medline, the Internet experts in the field of P4P, and reference lists of retrieved documents. Many P4P programs will not have been described in the scientific literature as indexed in Medline, but policy documents will often be available on websites, especially in case of a publicly administered program. Therefore, not conducting an Internet search will likely result in many relevant documents not being identified. Furthermore, P4P programs often have specific names that do not include common terms such as "pay for performance" or "financial incentives." By consulting experts, we sought to identify additional documents describing the features of programs we might have missed as a result of the specific keywords we used.
We searched Medline through PubMed using the following keywords: pay for performance, P4P, pay for quality, bonus, malus, reward, penalty, withhold, financial/monetary/ economic incentive, quality-/performance-/efficiency-based incentive/pay*/ funding/remuneration/reimbursement, and value-based purchasing. These keywords were combined with the following terms: physician, doctor, practitioner, clinician, specialist, hospital, facility, clinic, nursing home, provider, HMO, MCO, IPA, POS, PPO, primary care, general practice, long-term care, elderly care, preventive care, and rehabilitation. This yielded 21 relevant articles. Using the same (combination of) keywords, we searched the Internet via Google and Google Scholar, yielding another 25 documents and websites. Consultation of country-specific experts resulted in four additional documents. Finally, four additional documents were identified after screening the reference lists of retrieved documents. During our search, we used information obtained from a particular source as input for consulting other sources. For example, if we found an article insufficiently describing the characteristics of a seemingly relevant program, we searched the different sources using program-specific keywords to obtain additional information. In total, we obtained 54 documents describing the features of 13 non-U.S. P4P programs. While reviewing the literature on non-U.S. P4P programs, we simultaneously looked for documents describing typical P4P-program design in the United States. We identified two review articles via the Medline search and four additional documents via the Internet.
To be included, documents had to be written in English, Dutch, or German and had to contain a clear description of at least one relevant program feature. The following features were considered relevant: incentivized performance dimensions, number and type of included performance measures, adopted methods to mitigate providers' risk (including approaches to risk adjustment and data aggregation), monitoring and feedback mechanisms to detect and counter undesired behavior, information on sample size, strategies to involve and engage providers, information on targeted providers, strategies to facilitate inclusion of providers with small patient panels, participation (voluntary, mandatory, rates), size and type of financial incentives, number and type of performance targets, and payment frequency. In our initial searches, we excluded documents published before 2005 to ensure sufficiently up-to-date program descriptions. However, for some programs this resulted in incomplete data, so for these programs we extended our search by searching for documents published since 2000. For the U.S. programs, we only included documents providing an overview/review of typical program design in the United States (i.e., single program descriptions were excluded).
Data Extraction and Abstraction
In extracting and summarizing the data, three steps were followed. For each of these steps, separate abstraction forms organized according to the three main categories of P4P-program design (see Table 1 ) were used. The first step entailed reducing and categorizing the information in the documents in a table with only information about program design and relevant contextual factors (e.g., health care system features and concurrent improvement efforts). Everything related to the features listed above was written down in detail to ensure that important information would not be missed. In the second step, using a new form, we compressed the table constructed in Step 1 (e.g., eliminating contextual factors), considerably reducing its length. For the purpose of presentation, this table was subsequently altered and split in three parts, one for each of the three main categories. These tables can be found in an appendix (available from the author on request). In the final step, program features were summarized in a single table, incorporating only the key findings on the main themes.
Since the literature search and the data extraction/coding were performed by one reviewer, it was not possible to compare results and resolve differences among multiple reviewers. Instead, to ensure reliability both the searches and the data extraction/ coding were performed at two points in time, with 3 to 4 months in between.
Critical Review of Programs' Design
An important objective of this article is to critically review the design of identified programs. Because the literature reviewed in the previous section does not provide much insight into the weights of the various design elements, we judged the appropriateness for each element separately. This was done for each program by awarding a "+" (appropriate design) or a "−" (inappropriate design). The programs were judged on the following aspects: the set of measures is sufficiently broad and varied, risk adjustment is applied for outcome and resource use measures, efforts are used to mitigate providers' risk, providers are monitored for undesired behavior and receive adequate feedback if necessary, providers are actively involved in the design, performance is only measured on the level of the individual physician if sample size seems sufficient, strategies are used to facilitate inclusion of "small" providers, participation is voluntary and the majority of eligible providers participate, negative incentives are used appropriately, incentive size and frequency seem appropriate, absolute performance targets or piece rates are used, multiple targets are used (with larger payments for reaching higher targets) or targets are based on baseline performance.
Description and Critical Review of Identified P4P Programs
We retrieved information on 13 programs initiated in 9 countries. Table 2 contains general characteristics, Table 3 shows descriptive information on the programs' design, and Table 4 provides insights into the extent to which programs have been designed appropriately. 1 Seven programs are regional while six have been implemented nationally. Eight programs were initiated by a public purchaser (typically operating in a single-purchaser health care system) and five by private insurers responsible for managing care for their enrollees. P4P is often combined with nonfinancial incentives; providers regularly receive performance feedback and scores are publicly reported in at least five cases. What Is Being Incentivized? 2
Programs vary in the performance dimensions that are included. All programs incentivize clinical quality, which in five programs is the sole focus. Other targeted dimensions include patient experience and satisfaction, financial performance, capacity, 3 and access. In the programs focusing on multiple dimensions, clinical quality generally gets most weight (54% on average) and contains most measures. There is also variation in targeted areas within dimensions (data not shown , QOF) are also common. Four programs have adopted a measure set containing at least 30 measures pertaining to clinical quality and patient experience/satisfaction or access. In Table 4 , these programs are awarded a "+." Maccabi also scores a "+" on this aspect because a measure unknown to providers is defined retrospectively and added with 10% weight. Especially CPIP, the Primary Care Renewal Models (PCRM), PMP, and Ergebnis Orientierte Vergütung (ERGOV) include little domains and small measure sets. In view of the relatively large payments in CPIP and uncertain financial consequences in ERGOV, concerns about teaching to the test are particularly large in these programs. The most comprehensive program is QOF, containing more than 130 measures in about 30 areas. Despite this, there is mixed evidence of teaching to the test. One study showed neither improvement nor deterioration in unrewarded conditions (Steel, Maisey, Clark, Fleetcroft, & Howe, 2007) . Another study showed a positive effect on unrewarded aspects of an included condition, a deterioration of unrewarded aspects of two other included conditions, and a reduction of the continuity of care (Campbell, Reeves, Kontopantelis, Sibbald, & Roland, 2009 ). These latter two findings may have been a result of the large bonuses, which may have crowded out general practitioners' (GPs) intrinsic motivation. McDonald and Roland (2009, p. 123) found that "the requirement to enter data into the [EMR] to respond to the large number of targets was described as reducing eye contact, increasing time spent on data collection, and potentially crowding out the patient's agenda." Yet regarding incentivized performance, average attainment exceeds the maximum target for almost all clinical measures (Doran & Roland, 2010) , suggesting that money has not been the sole motivation for reaching high performance levels (Campbell, McDonald, & Lester, 2008) . Programs also differ in the use of risk-mitigating measures. Risk adjustment is used in AQ, ERGOV, and PMP for outcome and financial measures. Especially in AQ and ERGOV, risk adjustment seems fairly sophisticated, controlling for demographic, socioeconomic, and morbidity-based risk factors. Not all programs that include outcomes (seven in total) apply risk adjustment. NHI-P4P includes unadjusted outcomes for diabetes, breast cancer, and tuberculosis (TB). This may have resulted in the finding that for diabetes, older patients and patients with greater disease severity or comorbidity were more likely to be excluded than younger patients and patients with less disease severity (Chen, Chung, Lin, & Lai, 2011) . QOF also includes unadjusted intermediate outcomes, but practices are allowed to exclude certain patients from the measurements. While this provides practices with a tool to increase income by excluding "difficult" patients or patients for whom targets had been missed rather than because of an appropriate reason, there is little evidence of inappropriate use (Doran, Reeves, Gravelle, & Roland, 2008; Gravelle, Sutton, & Ma, 2008) . Audits and financial penalties for fraud may have contributed to preventing this. In the different programs, various other riskmitigating measures are applied. For example, Maccabi differentiates performance targets based on how current performance is affected by population characteristics and case mix. Yet in general, although the documents provide limited information on the use of risk-mitigating measures, the results raise doubts about whether differences in (patient) risk are sufficiently equalized, especially in NHI-P4P, Clalit, Maccabi, Primary Care (PC)-P4P, and PQI.
In most programs providers are actively involved in the design. Provider support is considered a critical success factor, and is being reached in various ways, including consensus meetings (AQ, PIN, PC-P4P, PQI), delegating measure development to providers or provider organizations (CPIP, Maccabi, PIP, QOF), and adjusting measures based on provider feedback (CPIP, PIN, PC-P4P, PQI). A notable exception is PMP, in which measures seem to be imposed top-down. According to Buetow (2008, p. 42) , it is "unclear that the program appropriately reflects the values and goals of (. . .) providers of primary health care (. . .)."
Who Is Being Incentivized? 4
Payments are mostly provided at the group level. Targeted "groups" vary in size and structure, ranging from hospitals (AQ, CPIP) to large multispecialty organizations (PMP) to primary care practices (QOF, PC-P4P, PIP). In five programs, payments are either provided only to individual physicians or to individuals and groups. Targeting individuals is appropriate for measures that are under physicians' direct control. In PIP, payment is provided to the practice for measures for which this does not seem to hold. For example, GPs receive an enhanced fee for each Pap smear, but the practice receives a fixed amount per patient if a specified percentage of patients are screened. In NHI-P4P, payment is provided to hospitals for diabetes and cancer, but directly to individual physicians for asthma and tuberculosis. In PCRM, all payments are mostly made directly to GPs. Yet for many measures included in these programs, sample size may well be insufficient to generate reliable profiles, especially for outcomes and resource use (Hofer et al., 1999; Krein et al., 2002; Scholle et al., 2008) . This also seems relevant for PIP, PC-P4P, and QOF as many GPs still work in solo or small group-practices. For several programs documents state that measures are only included if they are sufficiently under providers' control and/or if sample size is sufficient. However, it is unclear when this is the case. Some programs (e.g., AQ and PC-P4P) aggregate individual measures into composites scores, which could enhance reliability (Holmboe et al., 2010; Kaplan, Griffith, Price, Pawlson, & Greenfield, 2009 ). In PC-P4P, this resulted in fair reliability, despite that many practices were solo or duo practices. Although it is hard to draw conclusions, there are concerns about whether providers can be adequately discriminated from each other and thus, whether payment allocation occurs adequately.
In seven programs (AQ, Clalit, CPIP, Maccabi, PMP, PQI, QOF) participation rates are virtually 100%. In PIP, PCRM, and NHI-P4P participation exceeds 50%. Low participation may be problematic in ERGOV, PCRM, and NHI-P4P. In ERGOV, participating clinics are recognized as preferred providers. Especially if receiving care from nonpreferred providers involves large out-of-pocket payments, this may be a strong incentive to participate. But participation may still not be attractive as it involves a considerable administrative burden while financial consequences are highly uncertain. To achieve meaningful differences, participation needs to increase (Gerdes et al., 2009) . Also in NHI-P4P for breast cancer, low participation seems to be a result of the additional financial risk that participation involves and the fact that hospitals experience survival rates, which determine whether or not they receive a bonus, to be largely beyond their control (Kuo, Chung, & Lai, 2011) .
How Is Being Incentivized? 5
Two programs have adopted financial penalties. In ERGOV, bonuses for high performers are financed by maluses for low performers. Although this contributes to financial sustainability, incentives for gaming may be large (Gerdes et al., 2009 ). To prevent this, clinics are required to supply data via an online tool enabling auditing and checks. In AQ, penalties are imposed for successive low performers. Also, if hospitals fail to meet targets for data accuracy and completeness they receive a penalty or are excluded from the program. Compared with ERGOV, the financial risk of participation clearly is smaller. Also, there is less uncertainty as payments are fixed.
Payment size varies considerably. In AQ, in addition to payments for patientreported outcomes, hospitals can earn a 4% add-on to the national tariff for the relevant condition. In CPIP, bonus potential is 5% to 10% of the average DRG (Diagnosis Related Group) price. In NHI-P4P, payments per patient per year are mostly maximized. For cervical cancer, fees may be increased by up to 50%. For breast cancer patients, eligible hospitals receive a bundled payment, which is higher than the regular payments. Hospitals also meeting targets for disease-free survival are eligible for a bonus of up to 7% of the bundled payment. The payments in PMP are "small in relation to total PHO incomes" (Buetow, 2008, p. 40) . Also in PCRM, "the monetary values of the P4P incentives are a relatively very small proportion of the total income of GPs" (J. Li, Hurley, DeCicca, & Buckley, 2010, p. 15) . In contrast, in QOF payments can be up to 30% of practices' revenues, which appears to have contributed to large improvements (Doran & Roland, 2010 ). Yet it is likely that smaller payments would have generated similar results.
Eight programs only incentivize absolute performance. In AQ, hospitals in the top two quartiles are eligible for payment, and in ERGOV, clinics are judged on their performance relative to the mean. In Maccabi, only the three clinics in each of the five clinic size categories that best achieve their own target receive a bonus proportional to the degree of target attainment. Six programs use three or more targets or a sliding scale. PIN typically uses five targets per measure with a large differential between tiers. A similar approach is used in PCRM, which may well have contributed to the finding of J. , who observed that improvements in incentivized measures were typically largest among GPs with low or medium baseline performance. PMP and QOF use a sliding scale. Providers in PMP earn more for a larger percentage improvement from baseline to the target. In QOF, each measure has lower and upper targets delineating the scale. Improvements in performance were most pronounced for GPs with low scores at baseline (Doran, Fullwood, Kontopantelis, & Reeves, 2008) , which may have been a result of the sliding scale on which practices are scored. NHI-P4P provides piece rates for process quality. For example, for breast cancer, hospitals are rewarded for each patient completing recommended treatment. This feature may well have contributed to improvements in process and outcome quality (Kuo et al., 2011) . While the use of multiple targets is important especially in relative schemes, the four programs using relative targets typically use only one or two targets. An exception is PC-P4P; practices above the 25th percentile are eligible for a bonus and divided into six groups. 6
Comparison With P4P Programs in the United States 7
In the United States, there were an estimated 256 P4P programs in 2007. The last column of Table 3 shows the features of a typical U.S. P4P-program. Similar to non-U.S. programs, clinical quality is the most commonly incentivized dimension, followed by resource use/efficiency (40%-50% of programs), information technology (IT) adoption (30%-40% of programs), and patient experience or satisfaction. Especially efficiency and IT adoption seem to be more common in U.S. programs. Measure sets are typically quite small in the United States, typically ranging from 10 to 25 measures. Nine of the non-U.S. programs fall within or are close to this range. These relatively small numbers mainly are a result of strict inclusion criteria such as consistency with other improvement efforts and endorsement of professional organizations. To our knowledge no study has found evidence of teaching to the test as a result of P4P in the United States (e.g., Glickman et al., 2007; Mullen et al., 2010) . Although outcome measures are increasingly used, process and structural measures are much more common. Similar to non-U.S. programs, if outcomes are included, they usually pertain to intermediate effects in physician programs and complication and mortality rates in hospital programs. The limited use of outcomes seems to be a result of lack of data and concerns about the adequacy of risk adjustment. Yet risk adjustment is increasingly being applied, especially in hospital programs. Finally, many purchasers underscore the importance of active involvement and engagement of providers. Mechanisms are often in place to obtain providers' ongoing input, and providers usually have the option to raise concerns about scores and underlying data.
Regarding the United States, the vast majority of P4P programs target groups. In hospital programs, purchasers use a variety of strategies to avoid small numbers, including using multipurchaser data, constructing composite scores, and only using measures that apply to large numbers of patients. In physician programs, most purchasers require that a minimum number of patients be attributed to an individual provider. This is also the case in some of the non-U.S. programs, although the retrieved documents were generally not very specific on this topic. Similar to non-U.S. programs, most U.S. programs operate in primary care, although programs for hospitals and specialists have been increasing in number. In 2007, there were more than 40 hospital programs and of all physician programs in 2006, 41% only target primary care physicians, none target specialists only, and 59% target both.
More than 60% of the U.S. P4P-programs only use bonuses, although withholds are still relatively common (10%-20% of programs). Estimated average payment size is about 7% for physicians and 2.5% for hospitals (Med-Vantage, 2009 ). Payment frequency is mostly annual, although ongoing payments are becoming increasingly common. Programs using absolute targets have increased in number and most physician programs now reward absolute performance. However, relative targets are still used in about 50% of all programs. This compares well with the non-U.S. programs in that relative targets are used more by competing purchasers than by single purchasers.
Discussion
This study provides an international overview of P4P initiatives in health care. The 13 identified programs have similar design in several respects. They all incentivize clinical quality and most of them only use positive incentives, actively involve providers in design, target primary care providers, and pay on an annual basis. However, there is also considerable heterogeneity regarding the breadth of measure sets, use of risk-mitigating measures, payment size, and number and type of targets.
In most programs there seems to be ample room to increase incentive strength and to mitigate incentives for undesired behavior. In particular, shortcomings pertain to the number and type of included performance measures, risk adjustment of outcomes and resource use, reliability of measurements, payment frequency, and number of targets. Modification seems relevant especially for Clalit, ERGOV, Maccabi, and NHI-P4P but, also for other programs there is room for improvement, notably regarding measure sets, risk-mitigating methods, and payment size. For some aspects design does seem appropriate in most programs. These include provider involvement in design (nine programs), voluntary participation (nine programs), and type of targets (absolute targets or piece-rates in nine programs). AQ and QOF seem to have been designed particularly well. The effectiveness of QOF has been evaluated in several studies, and the positive results (Doran & Roland, 2010) seem to correspond with this finding. AQ had not been formally evaluated yet at the time of writing.
Despite that the design of NHI-P4P seems to be lacking in several respects, several studies have found positive effects of this program (e.g., Kuo et al., 2011; Lee, Cheng, Chen, & Lai, 2010; . At first glance this may seem surprising, but the shortcomings in NHI-P4P's design mainly pertain to aspects that mitigate undesired behavior, including a relatively narrow definition of performance (concerns about teaching to the test), no risk adjustment for outcomes (incentives for selection), and limited provider involvement in design (provider support less likely). Typically, the cited evaluations lack an assessment of these types of undesired consequences, and the one study we know of (Chen et al., 2011) found evidence of risk selection. Thus, although incentivized aspects appear to have improved, this may have come at the cost of worse performance on unincentivized aspects.
The programs identified in this review share several design features with the typical P4P program in the United States: clinical quality is the most commonly included dimension and generally gets most weight (50% or more); measure sets are usually relatively small; outcome measures are not often included and when they are, they pertain to similar aspects; engagement of providers is considered a critical success factor; most programs target physician groups in primary care; and payments are mostly made on an annual basis. There are notable differences as well. Negative incentives are still more often used than in non-U.S. programs. In addition, ongoing payments are more often applied in the United States. Furthermore, although for physician programs payment size appears to be similar (perhaps somewhat higher in the non-U.S. programs), for hospitals generally more generous payments are used in the non-U.S. programs. Finally, relative targets are more often found in U.S. programs. This may be explained by the competitive nature of the U.S. health care system. Providers (as well as purchasers) in competitive systems are used to competitive forces and therefore the use of relative targets may be more acceptable to providers. This is backed by the finding that among the non-U.S. programs, relative targets are used only in programs initiated by competing purchasers (AQ is an exception). Competition may also be an explanation for the finding that U.S. programs rely more on efficiency measures than non-U.S. programs; of the three non-U.S. programs incorporating financial performance or efficiency, two were initiated by competing purchasers similar to HMOs in the United States. Among other "competitive programs," ERGOV uses a budget neutral approach and PC-P4P has considerably reduced payments for budgetary reasons. U.S. programs also more often include measures of IT adoption. Besides the fact that specific IT applications themselves may benefit performance, the problems associated with using claims files to generate performance information and the high costs of manually extracting data from medical records are probable explanations for the (increasing) use of such measures. As the diffusion of P4P continues and the adequacy of performance measurement becomes more relevant, it can be expected that such measures will increasingly be used in non-U.S. programs as well.
Implications
Our findings have several implications for the future of P4P as a performance improvement approach. First, inadequately designed programs may stimulate undesired provider behavior, including teaching to the test and risk selection, and more insight is required in how such behavior can be prevented. Several studies have confirmed that risk selection is not just a theoretical concept (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Dranove et al., 2003; McDonald & Roland, 2009; Shen, 2003) and although evidence on teaching to the test is limited and mixed (Campbell et al., 2009; Glickman et al., 2007; Mullen et al., 2010; Steel et al., 2007) , Mullen et al. (2010) rightly argue that the concern that P4P encourages teaching to the test should not be dismissed. Given the complex and largely unobservable nature of health care quality, we can only study some potential unintended consequences but we cannot confirm or reject the existence of all such effects (. . .). The negative incentives of P4P (. . .) should be taken seriously given evidence that providers do indeed respond to incentives. (p. 86)
Many current P4P programs are lacking with respect to design elements that relate to preventing undesired behavior (specifically teaching to the test and risk selection), and there is large variation in the use of risk-mitigating measures. This suggests that purchasers, though clearly concerned about them, are uncertain about how to effectively prevent undesired effects. Thus, as such effects can potentially undermine the entire program, more insight into how they can be prevented is required. For example, research should continue to focus on developing adequate risk-adjustment models than can be transparently applied in practice and on the merits and drawbacks of potentially viable alternatives or supplements such as exception reporting.
Second, if P4P is to contribute to improved patient outcomes, payment allocation must be based on timely, reliable, and comprehensive performance data. Many shortcomings in the design of current programs, including low payment frequencies, small measure sets, limited use of outcomes, and lack of risk adjustment, can be traced back to a lack of suitable data. Therefore, efforts should continue to focus on creating reliable and easy-to-apply methods for registering, processing, extracting, and validating patient-level data, and the merits of IT for these purposes should be explored further.
Third, breakthrough improvements require coordination across disciplines and alignment of incentives for all providers in the continuum of care. Current P4P programs focus too much on a specific sector and type of provider (physician groups in primary care). Aligned incentives require strategies to facilitate inclusion of small practice settings (e.g., by developing methods for reliably aggregating performance data) as well as incorporating incentives that encourage coordination. Customized IT and forms of prospective payment (e.g., episode-based payments or case rates) will prove vital in attaining these goals. If structured around patients rather than providers, risk-adjusted prospective payment with performance-based elements can both reduce the problem of overuse of low-value services and reward providers for coordinating care effectively not only when the patient arrives at the office but also when she or he is out of sight (Rosenthal, 2007) .
Fourth, it is crucial that programs are formally evaluated using convincing comparison groups. Of the programs identified in the study, only seven have been evaluated, and mostly only partially. There is a paucity of empirical research on the influence of specific design choices, and we still know very little about which designs are most effective given a particular context. Therefore, evaluations should preferably not only assess the overall effectiveness but also include an assessment of undesired effects and the influence of specific design elements. This not only provides insight in which parts require modification but may also provide important lessons about appropriate design in different settings.
Finally, provider input is essential in developing risk-mitigating measures, preventing unintended consequences, generating reliable performance information, designing payments models that encourage coordination and improvement across the continuum of care, and conducting adequate program evaluations.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, conclusions about (appropriate) design were not always possible because the documents often lack specific information. For example, if risk adjustment is applied, the relevant program scores a "+" for this aspect in Table 4 , despite limited information about the adequacy of this risk adjustment. Thus, the analysis necessarily provides only indications of the appropriateness of design. Second, conclusions about the appropriateness of design are largely based on theory and have not been confirmed in practice. Many of the programs identified in this study have not been (extensively) evaluated and regarding the programs that have been evaluated, the extent to which specific design features have contributed to changes in performance is unclear. Third, it is likely that some relevant programs were not identified as a result of the search strategy, specifically the language restriction. Finally, this study suffers from publication bias. We know, for example, that there are other P4P programs in effect in Canada (Canadian Medical Association, 2010), Germany, Italy (Fiorentini, Iezzi, Lippi Bruni, & Ugolini, 2011 ), Spain (Gené-Badia et al., 2007 Pedrós et al., 2009) , Switzerland, and The Philippines (Peabody et al., 2011) , but we did not find sufficient information on these programs to be included in this review.
Conclusion
P4P is now widely applied in many health care systems and there are no indications that this will change in the near future. However, the current evidence base suggests that designing an effective P4P program is a highly complex undertaking. Given our limited knowledge about "what works" in P4P, it may then not be very surprising that the design of current programs is lacking in several respects (at least in theory) and that purchasers struggle with developing effective programs. To get the most out of P4P's potential, well-conducted evaluations are critical in generating the information needed for fine-tuning P4P to the specific settings of implementation. In particular, empirical research investigating the influence of specific design choices in specific settings is needed, as well as insight in the perverse incentives of P4P and how these can be prevented. In parallel, if P4P is to contribute to improved patient outcomes, efforts should continue to focus on creating reliable and easy-to-apply methods for generating comprehensive patient-level (performance) data.
